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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
RIO ALGOM CORPORATION, BRIEF OF APPELLfu~T 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
JIMCO LTD., HUMECA EXPLORATION 
COMPANY, JIM L. HUDSON, JUANITA 
J. MEYER AS EXECUTRIX OF THE 
ESTATE OF DANIEL H. MEYER, 
ELDON J. CARD, NORMA HUDSON, 
JEAN L. CARD, JUANITA J. MEYER, 
N. J. WHITE, AUDREY WHITE, 
WILMA WHITE, OTIS DIBLER, 
DOROTHY MAE DIBLER, GRACE DAVIS, 
and MARLOWE C. SMITH, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
* * * * * * * 
CASE NO. 16032 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a declaratory judgment action brought by plaintiff-
appellant, Rio Algom Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 
"Rio") against two groups of respondent-defendants, the Jimcos 1 
2 
and the Audreys. Rio's complaint seeks a declaration of the 
method it should employ in calculating and paying royalty 
obligations owed to both groups of Defendants under two agree-
ments relating to the lease of certain unpatented uranium 
mining claims. 
l This group consists of Jimco Ltd., Humeca Exploration 
Company, Jim L. Hudson, Juanita J. Meyer (both individually 
and as Executrix of the Estate of Daniel H. Meyer), Eldon J. 
Card, Norma Hudson and Jean L. Card. 
2 This group consists of Audrey White, N. Y. White, Wilma 
White, Otis Dibler, Dorothy Mae Dibler, Grace Davis and Marlowe 
C. Smith. 
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The Jimco defendants counterclaimed against Rio, seeking 
rescission or reformation and damages based on theories of 
mutual mistake, unilateral mistake, breach of an implied 
covenant, fraud and negligent misrepresentation. The Jimcos 
also crossclaimed against the Audrey defendants on theories of 
mutual mistake, unilateral mistake, fraud and negligent misrepre-
sentation. 
The Audrey defendants crossclaimed against the Jimco 
defendants and counterclaimed against Rio asserting breach of 
an agreement with the Jimco defendants, of which Rio is the 
assignee. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This appeal is from an Order entered by Judge Dean E. 
Conder of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County 
which dismissed all claims by Rio and the Jimcos against the 
Audreys, all claims by the Audreys against Rio and the Jimcos, 
and certain claims by Rio against the Jimcos. The Order here 
appealed from was entered by Judge Conder based upon an agree-
ment purportedly binding all parties, including Rio, although 
only the Jimcos and the Audreys were parties to that agree-
ment, and Rio timely objected to its provisions. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Rio seeks reversal of Judge Conder's Order, which dis-
missed the Audreys from this lawsuit and determined that Rio 
-2-
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has no cause of action based on the agreement entered into 
between the Audreys and the Jimcos. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Relationship of the Parties. 
Rio and the Audreys are tenants in common of certain 
unpatented mining claims in San Juan County, Utah, containing 
valuable uranium ore. Rio owns a one-fourth and the Audreys 
a three-fourth undivided interest in these properties. In 
June 1968, Rio and the Audreys entered into an agreement 
leasing these claims to the Jimcos. That agreement has been 
styled the "Amended Audrey Lease" in this lawsuit (R. 74-125). 
In July 1968, the Jimcos in turn granted Rio an option to 
take an assignment of their leasehold interest in those uranium 
claims under an agreement entitled the "Rio-Jimco Option Agree-
ment" (R. 7-72). Rio exercised this option, took possession 
of the claims, developed a uranium mine, and built a mill to 
refine the ore extracted from these claims and others. Since 
taking possession in 1968 Rio has been mining, refining and 
marketing the uranium ore extracted from the claims (R. 2101) . 
The following schematic summarizes the relationships 
between the parties: 
-3-
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Lessors AUDREYS (3/4 owner) RIO (1/4 owner) 
AMENDED AU 
'" JIMCOS l (Lessee) 
RIO-JIMCO 
If 
RIO 
(Assignee of 
Leasehold) 
2. Pertinent Royalty Provisions. 
Co-owners of 
unpatented 
mineral claims 
DREY LEASE 
OPTION AGREEMENT 
(a) Royalties under the Amended Audrey Lease. In 
the Amended Audrey Lease the Jimcos agreed to pay a royalty of 
four percent of the price received for yellowcake (u 3o8 ) to the 
Audrey defendants and Rio, the owners-lessors, (R. 80-83). In 
addition, the Audreys and Rio reserved the right in the Amended 
Audrey Lease to have those royalties based on eight percent of 
the fair market value of crude ore produced from the claims, in 
lieu of the four percent royalty just described (R. 80). In 
other words, the owners were entitled to royalties based on 
either four percent of the price received for the refined 
product (u 3o8 ) or on eight percent of the value of unprocessed, 
raw ore, at their election. The decision to elect either the 
eight percent ore or four percent yellowcake royalty is vested 
-4-
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exclusively in the Audreys under the Amended Audrey Lease, and 
Rio is not entitled to participate in that decision (R. 80, 118). 
Rio gave up the right to participate in making the royalty 
election decision after negotiations between all three parties. 
The other parties were concerned that Rio would have a conflict 
of interest in making the election because it was both a lessor 
(under the Lease) and a lessee (under the Rio-Jimco Option 
Agreement). As the Audrey lease exP,lains: 
21.3 Rio . shall, by reason of its 
interest in this Lease as described in 
Section II hereof, be excluded from any 
vote or decision of the lessors relating 
to royalties. . [R.l20] 
2.3 The parties hereto recognize and 
acknowledge that Rio Algorn Corporation, 
in a capacity distinct from its capacity 
as one of the Lessors herein, on June 18, 
1968 held a valid and subsisting option 
to acquire an assignment of the lease-
hold interest of the Lessee. The 
parties hereto recognize the validity of 
the exercise of said option by Rio .... 
[Section II, R.79-80]. 
While Rio delegated the election decision to the Audreys 
in the foregoing provisions, however, it certainly expected 
that the Audreys would make the election from time to time so 
as to choose the election which would pay them the most 
money. That decision would of course also benefit Rio since 
it was entitled to one-fourth of the total royalties under 
either election. As one permissible royalty formula became more 
lucrative than the other because of changing market conditions 
for ore and yellowcake, all the parties doubtless anticipated 
that the Audreys would choose the more profitable of the two 
elections. 
-5-
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(b) Royalties under the Rio-Jimco Option Agreement. 
After Rio exercised the option granted to it by the Jimcos in 
the Rio-Jimco Option Agreement, it assumed the lessees' obli-
gation to pay royalties under the Amended Audrey Lease (R. 25). 
After Rio exercised that option it also became obligated to pay 
royalties to the Jirnco defendants. In summary, Rio became 
obligated by virtue of the two agreements to pay royalties to 
itself, the Jimcos, and the Audreys (R. 33-43). 
Like one of the two royalties payable to itself and the 
Audreys, the royalties which Rio was obligated to pay to the 
Jimcos are based on the price received for yellowcake. Those 
royalties may vary from eight percent to a ceiling of fifteen 
percent of that price (R. 33-35). The royalties due to the 
Jimcos are to be paid only after satisfaction of the full 
royalties due to the lessors (the Audreys and Rio) under the 
Amended Audrey Lease. It is this order of priority in making 
royalty payments which led to this lawsuit, since the Jimcos 
might conceivably collect no royalties at all under certain 
circumstances which are explained next. 
(c) Interrelationship of Royalties. As noted 
above, one of the elections available under the Amended Audrey 
Lease is based on yellowcake sales price, like the sole royalty 
basis for payments to the Jimcos under the Rio-Jimco Option 
Agreement. So long as the Audreys chose to elect royalties 
based on yellowcake price, then, the Jimcos would always be 
-6-
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assured of receiving the royalties allowable to them under the 
Rio-Jimco Option Agreement, up to the fifteen percent ceiling 
provided in that agreement. 
If market conditions changed, however, and the Audreys 
elected the second royalty option based on the value of crude 
ore, the Jimcos could conceivably be caught in a royalty "squeeze" 
and receive little or no royalties. The following hypotheticals 
illustrate this potential "squeezing effect." 
EXAHPLE I 
Assume: Total price for yellowcake 
Total value of ore 
$100.00 
$ 75.00 
Ceiling on total royalties 
payable $ 15.00 
I.A. If Audreys choose 4% 
yellowcake election, 
the parties receive: 
I.B. If Audreys choose 8% 
ore election, 
Audreys: 3% yellowcake 
= $3.00 
Rio: 
Jimco: 
l% yellowcake 
= $1.00 
$15 ceiling less 
royalties to 
Lessors: 
15 - [3+1] 
= $11.00 
15-4 
-7-
the parties receive: 
Audreys: 6% ore = 6% (75) 
= $4.50 
Rio: 
Jimcos: 
2% ore = 2% (75) 
= $1.50 
$15 less royalties 
to lessors: 
$15 - [4.50+1.50] 
$9.00 
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EXAMPLE II 
Assume: Total price for yellowcake 
Total value of ore 
Ceiling still same because 
yellowcake price same 
$100.00 
$187.50 
$ 15.00 
II.A If Audreys choose 4% 
yellowcake election, 
the parties receive the 
same royalties as I.A. 
II.B. If Audreys elect 8% 
ore, the parties receive: 
Audreys: 6% ore 6% (187.50) 
= $11.25 
Rio: 2% ore = 2% (187. SO, 
= $3.75 
Jimcos: $15- [11.25+3.75] 
= $15-15 = $0. 
The foregoing examples are of course hypothetical and are 
not intended to reflect actual current or projected values of 
ore and yellowcake. Nonetheless, they are useful to illustrate 
the general principle that the Jimcos' earned royalties will 
suffer, perhaps dramatically, if (1) the Audreys choose the 
eight percent ore royalty, and (2) the value of ore approaches 
or exceeds the price received for yellowcake. Even under the 
first example, in which ore has a lower total value than yellow-
cake, the Jimcos would receive $2.00 less under the ore election 
than they would under the yellowcake election -- an eighteen 
percent decrease in income. 
Nor are these examples completely hypothetical. Counsel 
for the Jimcos is in fact deeply concerned about this "squeeze," 
as illustrated by the following argument he made to the court: 
-8-
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If Audrey and Rio were to prevail on 
their original theory of fair market 
value of ore and get this Court to impose 
a fair market value figure that is in effect 
the present spot prices for small size, 
that would eliminate Jimco . . if the 
price goes up another couple of bucks. 
[Remarks of Mr. Savage, R.2206] 
3. Genesis of this Lawsuit. 
In August 1975, the Audrey defendants elected to exercise 
the option in the Amended Audrey Lease to change the royalty 
payment basis from the four percent yellowcake to the eight 
percent ore option (R. 3) . It must logically be assumed that 
they believed this election would increase the income they 
would receive as lessors. It was that election which gave 
rise to Rio's institution of this declaratory judgment action, 
after unsuccessful attempts by the parties to determine the 
basis for computing that royalty obligation. 
The Audreys asserted that the basis for calculating this 
royalty was to be arrived at by reference to an "external" 
uranium ore market, i.e., that the royalties should not be 
computed on the basis of what Rio itself received for sales of 
materials from the subject claims (R. 4). The Jirncos, on the 
other hand, asserted that the basis for calculating the royalty 
should be arrived at by reference to the "internal" market, 
i.e., Rio's actual selling price for yellowcake produced from 
the subject properties (R. 4). The Jimcos doubtless believed 
that this •· internal" reference would be lower than the Audreys' 
preferred "external" reference, so that the Jimcos' total 
-9-
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share of the royalties would not be reduced as much. Since 
the Jimcos and the Audreys could not compromise on these 
materially different positions, Rio instituted this action so 
that the court could resolve that issue (R. 6). 
4. The Purported "Settlement" Between the Audreys 
and Jimcos. 
In July 1978, shortly before the matter was scheduled to 
go to trial, the Audreys and the Jimcos entered into an agreement 
to which Rio was not a party, and which they cosmetically 
entitled "Settlement Stipulation and Motion." In that agreement, 
the Audreys and the Jimcos attempted to permanently determine 
the basis to be used by Rio in calculating its royalty obliga-
tions under the Amended Audrey Lease (R. 2241-2247). Not only 
was Rio not a party to this stipulation, Rio also objected to 
its terms. 
The purported settlement contains two provisions which Rio 
contends fundamentally violate its rights flowing from the 
Amended Audrey Lease. As noted above, the Amended Audrey Lease 
provided that the Audreys could annually elect whether to take 
their royalty on the basis of four percent yellowcake or eight 
percent ore. In the purported settlement agreement the Audreys 
forever forfeit this option, as more fully explained in the 
following contract language from the purported settlement: 
2. For the calendar year 1979, and all 
years thereafter, the Audrey defendants 
hereby waive their right to the election 
of royalty payments based upon market 
value of crude ore as provided in 
paragraph 3.2 of the Audrey Lease, and 
-10-
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agree to timely revoke their previous 
election under paragraph 3.2. Timely 
notice of the revocation of said election 
will be provided by the Audrey defendants 
to Rio. [R.2243]. 
Rio contends that the waiver of this election directly affects 
its rights and expectancy interests under the Amended Audrey 
Lease. Rio contends that it could originally have expected 
(when the contract was executed) that the Audreys would per-
petually make elections in their own selfish interests (and 
thereby benefit Rio which receives twenty-five percent of the 
royalties paid under the Audrey Lease). Under the purported 
settlement, however, the Audreys have forfeited this election 
and have agreed to perpetually elect four percent yellowcake, 
leaving Rio with twenty-five percent of that royalty (or one 
percent yellowcake) , even though the ore election may produce 
greater returns to Rio in the future. 
In exchange for the waiver of the election, the Jimcos 
agreed in paragraph l.c of the purported settlement to transfer 
certain of their royalties to the Audreys. The purported 
settlement provides that the Jimcos assign to the Audreys "that 
amount which, when added to that amount which the Audrey 
defendants would otherwise receive directly from Rio, equals 
5.5 percent of the proceeds received by Rio from Duke Power 
Company, or any other purchaser, for the sale of yellowcake" 
(R. 2243). 
Rio contends that this too directly violates its rights 
under the Audrey Lease because under that lease Rio always 
-11-
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received twenty-five percent of the "Audrey royalty pie," 
whereas under the new arrangement Rio will receive one percent 
of yellowcake while Audrey will receive 5.5 percent of yellow-
cake -- effectively reducing Rio's percentage of the so-called 
royalty pie from twenty-five percent to 15.3 percent. 
The purported settlement agreement was presented to the 
court for approval in the form of a "Settlement Stipulation and 
Motion." The motion for approval was much more than a mere 
request of the court to approve a settlement as between the two 
parties to that settlement; in addition, it requested the court 
to make a substantive ruling determining Rio's rights. The 
motion which accompanied the request for approval read as 
follows: 
The Audrey defendants and the Jimco defen-
dants hereby move the court for a ruling 
that Rio has no standing under either the 
Audrey lease or the Jimco agreement, or any 
other theory of law or equity, to challenge 
or otherwise bar the effectuation and 
implementation of the foregoing Settlement 
Stipulation, that such Settlement Stipula-
tion is not in violation of any duty owed 
to Rio by any of the defendants, that upon 
effectuation and implementation of said 
Settlement Stipulation the Audrey defendants 
are effectively and totally dismissed from 
this litigation, and that those funds 
presently on deposit with the court equal 
to 5.5% of the proceeds from the sale of 
yellowcake by Rio since January 1, 1976, 
together with accrued interest thereon, 
less any amounts previously withdrawn by 
Audrey defendants therefrom, be promptly 
paid to the Audrey defendants. [R.2246]. 
-12-
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What was presented to Judge Conder, therefore, was a 
procedurally unique request whereby he was directly asked to 
rule that the purported settlement had no impact whatsoever on 
any rights of Rio either in law or in equity. 
Rio filed objections to the proposed Settlement Stipula-
tion and also filed an amended complaint wherein it asserted 
that the Stipulation constituted, among other things, tortious 
interference with its contract rights, a breach of fiduciary 
duties owed to it, and a violation of its contract rights. 
After argument and the submission of memoranda (but with-
out the benefit of discovery, jury trial, or other procedural 
niceties) , the trial court summarily approved the Settlement 
Stipulation, ruled that Rio had no rights in the matter, 
allowed Rio to amend its complaint, and then dismissed the 
complaint for failure to state a cause of action. It is from 
this Order that the appeal is brought. 
The following chart briefly summarizes the various owner-
ship, tenancy and royalty relationships among the parties. 
-13-
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I. 
II. 
STATE~lliNT OF POINTS 
The trial court erred in approving the Stipulation 
because that agreement varies the Amended Audrey 
Lease and the Rio-Jimco Option Agreement without 
the concurrence of all parties to both agreements. 
The trial court erred in allowing the Audreys and 
Jimcos to alter the Amended Audrey Lease without 
Rio's consent, since Rio is an intended beneficiary 
of that lease. 
III. The trial court erred in approving the Stipulation 
because waiver of the royalty election in exchange 
IV. 
v. 
for an additional 2.5 percent yellowcake proceeds 
royalty is a breach by the Audreys of fiduciary duties 
owed to Rio. 
The trial court erred in approving the Stipulation 
because that agreement breaches an implied covenant 
by the Audreys in favor of Rio. 
The trial court erred in dismissing Rio's Amended 
Complaint. 
-15-
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PREFACE TO ARGU~ffiNT 
It should be understood by the Court, in reviewing the 
arguments which follow, that the unique and summary procedure 
employed below in approving the purported settlement, a pro-
cedure violative of fundamental concepts of due process, colors 
the entire appellate consideration of the substantive issues. 
The closest analogy that we can suggest is that the trial court 
has, in effect, granted a motion against Rio finding that Rio 
cannot state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (We 
suggest this analogy because there has been no trial of the 
matter, there was no evidentiary hearing, and there were not 
even the limited procedural safeguards normally attending a 
motion for summary judgment under Rule 56). Therefore, we 
contend that the normal appellate presumptions and standards 
applicable to a ruling under Rule 12(b) (6) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure should apply in the Court's analysis of the 
substantive issues set forth hereinafter. The legal standard in 
this state in such matters was set forth by this Court in 
Liquor Control Commission v. Athas, 121 Utah 457, 460, 243 P.2d 
441, 443 (1952), wherein the Court held: 
A motion to dismiss should not be granted 
unless it appears to a certainty that 
plaintiff would be entitled to no relief 
under any state of facts which could be 
proved in support of its claim. [Emphasis 
added]. 
See also Christensen v. Lelis Automatic Transmission Service, In~, 
24 Utah 2d 165, 467 P.2d 605 (1970). 
-l6-
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Merely because this matter has been presented in the form 
of a purported ''Settlement Agreement" (which automatically 
evokes the traditional judicial sympathy in favor of settling 
matters) , the Court should not lose sight of the fact that in 
addition to merely settling disputes as between themselves, 
the Audreys and Jimcos have purported definitively to deter-
mine the rights of Rio as well. 
We suggest, therefore, that in reviewing the arguments to 
follow herein, the Court review them as it would the granting 
of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6). The questions 
thus presented, for example, are not whether Audrey and Jimco 
have violated duties to Rio but whether, under the Athas 
holding, it has been demonstrated to a certainty that Rio 
could not prove a violation of duties under the pleadings as 
set forth in its Amended Complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
IN APPROVING THE STIPULATION 
BECAUSE THAT AGREEMENT VARIES 
THE AMENDED AUDREY LEASE 
AND THE RIO-JIMCO OPTION AGREEMENT 
WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF ALL PARTIES 
TO BOTH AGREEMENTS. 
By virtue of the Stipulation and the trial court's Order 
entered in accordance therewith, the Audrey defendants agreed 
to permanently waive the eight percent ore royalty election in 
-17-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
exchange for an additional yellowcake proceeds royalty of two 
and one-half percent. In so acting, the Audreys have permanently 
rescinded an election in whose proceeds Rio formerly would have 
shared, in exchange for an additional yellowcake royalty in 
which Rio will not share. Because of that agreement, Rio's 
participation in royalty proceeds from the subject claims will 
be permanently reduced from twenty-five percent of the whole to 
15.3 percent. 
The effect of the Stipulation is to work two material and 
permanent changes to the Amended Audrey Lease and the Rio-Jimco 
Option Agreement. Those modifications are: (1) permanent 
waiver of the ore election in the Amended Audrey Lease, and 
(2) a permanent reduction in Rio's pro rata share of royalties 
from the subject claims. The trial court erred in approving the 
Stipulation which implements those material changes to the 
agreements between the parties without Rio's consent to either 
change. 
The second change (reduction of Rio's share of the royalties) 
is by itself sufficient to constitute significant damage to Rio. 
But the first change (waiver of the election) could conceivably 
have an even more damaging impact. Reference to the hypotheticals 
in Section 2(c) of the preceding Statement of Facts is perhaps 
the best summary of the impact of this waiver on Rio. Had the 
Audreys maintained their insistence on an eight percent ore 
royalty, Rio might well have received considerably more money 
than it will under the four percent yellowcake election. By 
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abandoning the ore royalty the Audreys have of course also 
permanently precluded Rio from sharing in the consequences of 
that potentially more lucrative formula. 
The trial court approved this outcome and dismissed Rio's 
amended complaint without taking any evidence whatsoever on the 
potential consequences of the Audreys' waiver. Rather, the trial 
court was apparently persuaded by Jimco counsel's assertion in 
oral argument that, "You can't presume that Audrey would prevail 
on its theory of fair market value [at trial] and assume from 
that that Audrey and Rio together would have made a lot more 
money on the royalties. It can't be presumed that they are 
going to succeed" (Remarks of Mr. Savage, R.2304]. Certainly it 
cannot be "presumed" that the Audreys would have prevailed on 
their asserted basis for computing ore royalties. But it like-
wise cannot be "presumed," as the trial court apparently did, 
that the Audreys would certainly have lost at trial either. If, 
as Jimco counsel hinted, the Audreys had prevailed, Rio had paid 
the Lessors that ore royalty, and as a result "Audrey and Rio 
together ... made a lot more money on the royalties," then Rio 
is clearly damaged by the "settlement." It will never be entitled 
to that more lucrative income because the Audreys have abdicated 
the ore royalty election and the trial court failed to allow any 
discovery or trial on these potential damages. 
The trial court approved the "settlement" between the Audreys 
and Jimcos in complete disregard not only of Rio's claims of 
damage but also of the fundamental principle that a contract 
-19-
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cannot be modified without the consent of all contracting 
parties. In this case, both the Audrey Lease and the Rio-Jimco 
Agreement have been materially modified without Rio's consent. 
The Stipulation materially alters the terms of the Amended 
Audrey Lease, to which Rio was a party and a lessor, because 
both Rio's ownership rights and the former ore royalty election 
are set forth in that agreement. 
The Stipulation also materially amends the Rio-Jimco Option 
Agreement because that agreement expressly provided that Rio was 
assigned the Jimcos' tenancy rights under the Amended Audrey 
Lease subject to "all .. provisions, terms, covenants and 
conditions" contained in that lease (Rio-Jimco Option Agreement, 
Clause V(a), R. 24, and Amended Audrey Lease, 1119.1, R. 116-17). 
Because Rio was assigned the Jimcos' tenancy rights subject to 
all the terms and conditions of the Amended Audrey Lease, and 
because the terms of that lease have been materially modified in 
two respects by virtue of the Stipulation, the effect of the 
Stipulation is also to alter materially the obligations which 
Rio assumed under the Rio-Jimco Option Agreement. 
It is fundamental law that the terms of a written lease 
cannot be varied without the prior written consent of all lessors 
The same rule of course applies to all contracts: prior consent 
of all parties is a prerequisite to any material modification of 
the contract. E.g., 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, §465 at 935 ("A 
modification of a contract requires the assent of . all 
parties to the contract"). Accord: Malstrom v. Consolidated 
-20-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Theaters, 4 Utah 2d 181, 184, 290 P. 2d 689, 691 (1955). "A 
meeting of the minds of contracting parties is required not only 
to make a contract, but also to abrogate or modify it after it 
is made." Western Airlines v. Hollenbeck, 124 Colo. 130, 235 
P.2d 792, 796 (1951). For that matter, "[the] terms of a 
contract cannot be changed even for the benefit of a party 
without his knowledge and approval. Columbian Nat'l 
Life Ins. Co. v. McClain, 115 Colo. 458, 174 P.2d 348, 351 
(1946) [emphasis supplied]. 
Since Rio is a named lessor in the Amended Audrey Lease, 
the foregoing law clearly precludes any amendments to the terms 
of that lease without Rio's prior written consent. Similarly, 
the Rio-Jimco Option Agreement expressly precludes any amend-
ments to that agreement without the prior written consent of all 
parties (Clause XXX, R. 64). Because the amendments effected by 
the Stipulation do materially alter both those agreements, the 
trial court clearly erred in entering the Order appealed from, 
an Order approving a modification which violates fundamental 
contract law. Furthermore, given the express prohibition to 
amendments of the Rio-Jimco Option Agreement without the prior 
consent of all parties, the lower court's approval of the 
Stipulation also violates the fundamental rule that where "the 
intent of the parties can be ascertained with reasonable cer-
tainty it must be given effect." Maw v. Noble, 10 Utah 2d 440, 
443, 354 P. 2d 121, 123 (1960). 
Because the Stipulation violates the express intentions of 
the parties to both agreements, and because it materially alters 
-21-
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the terms of both agreements, the Order approving that Stipu-
lation must be reversed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
ALLOWING THE AUDREYS AND JIMCOS 
TO ALTER THE AMENDED AUDREY LEASE 
WITHOUT RIO'S CONSENT, SINCE RIO 
IS AN INTENDED BENEFICIARY OF THAT LEASE. 
Rio is not only a party to but also an intended bene-
ficiary of the Amended Audrey Lease. Rio is an intended 
beneficiary by virtue of the lease provisions governing the 
royalty election. That is, although Rio is not allowed to 
exercise the royalty election, a decision vested solely in the 
Audreys, it is still entitled to participate in the outcome of 
whichever election is made since it is a one-fourth owner and 
therefore has a one-fourth interest in any royalty payments 
made under the lease. 
Rio is an intended beneficiary of the lease because the 
original contracting parties, including Rio, intended that it 
would be benefited (i.e., that it would receive one-fourth of 
the royalty payments) under the election option. See Hammill v. 
Maryland Cas. Co., 209 F.2d 338 (lOth Cir. 1954); !1ontgomery v. 
Rief, 15 Utah 495, 50 P. 623 (1897). 
Once a beneficiary has accepted or acted on the terms of 
an agreement made for his benefit, the original parties to 
that agreement cannot alter its provisions without the consent 
of that beneficiary. See Manning v. Wiscombe, 498 F.2d 1311 
(lOth Cir. 1974) (applying Utah law). 
-22-
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-When the Audrey defendants signed the Stipulation, they 
agreed permanently to waive their right to exercise the eight 
percent ore royalty election. The effect of this decision was 
to abdicate forever the rights of both Rio and the Audreys to 
choose to have royalties paid based upon eight percent of the 
fair market value of crude ore. The permanent waiver of that 
election constitutes a material modification to the Amended 
Audrey Lease, a modification made without Rio's consent and 
accomplished by virtue of an agreement to which it was not a 
party. 
Therefore, because the effect of the Stipulation is to 
vary the Amended Audrey Lease without Rio's consent, even 
though Rio is an intended beneficiary, the trial court erred 
in approving the Stipulation and its Order must be reversed. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPROVING 
THE STIPULATION BECAUSE WAIVER 
OF THE ROYALTY ELECTION IN EXCHANGE 
FOR AN ADDITIONAL 2.5 PERCENT YELLOWCAKE PROCEEDS 
ROYALTY IS A BREACH BY THE AUDREYS 
OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES OWED TO RIO. 
When the trial court approved the Audrey defendants' 
permanent waiver of the royalty election, it also approved a 
deliberate breach of fiduciary duties owed by the Audreys to 
Rio. As a one-fourth owner of the properties, Rio was entitled 
to the benefits of whichever election was made by the Audrey 
defendants, even though it had no right to exercise that elec-
tion option itself. When the Audrey defendants agreed perrnan-
ently to waive that option, in whose benefits Rio was formerly 
-23- d 
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entitled to partici?ate, and the Audreys received in exchange an 
additional 2.5 percent royalty, they clearly engaged in self-
dealing to Rio's detriment. 
In Britton v. Green, 325 F.2d 377 (lOth Cir. 1963), co-
owners of oil and gas leases sued another co-owner whom they had 
designated as the operating agent and lessee of those properties. 
The co-tenant/operating agent agreed in the leases to operate 
the subject properties to the mutual interests of all parties to 
the leases. The co-tenant/lessors alleged that the operating 
agent had failed to protect and market the minerals discovered 
in his drilling activities. 
The Tenth Circuit noted that when one or more co-tenants 
vest another co-tenant with the rights and responsibilities of 
operating their common property, all the co-tenants "become co-
adventurers in the enterprise, and stand in a fiducial relation-
ship to each other." The court further noted that the operating 
agent/co-tenant assumed the responsibility under the leases of 
acting "for and on behalf of his co-tenants and he is thus the 
trustee for his co-tenants and co-adventurers." 325 F.2d at 
383. The court also explained that, given this interrelationship 
between the parties, the operating agent assumed the following 
responsibilities: 
[A]n undivided owner who is to manage 
and operate the lease stands in a fiduciary 
relationship to his coadventurers and is 
bound to exercise the utmost good faith 
in managing and operating such lease and 
reporting and accounting to his co-owners 
with respect to such management and 
operation. 
Id. at 387-88. 
-24-
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Rio and the Audreys stand in a position similar to that 
among the co-owners in Britton. Both parties are tenants in 
common of the subject claims, and Rio delegated to the Audreys 
an important right under the Amended Audrey Lease, i.e., the 
decision to elect between either permissible basis for royalty 
payments under that lease. Therefore, the Audreys owe Rio a 
fiduciary duty in exercising that royalty election, and they 
must make election decisions in a manner which evidences the 
"utmost good faith" and which benefits not only themselves but 
Rio as well. When the Audreys took an additional 2.5 percent 
yellowcake royalty by virtue of the Stipulation, increasing 
their own royalty interest and decreasing Rio's pro rata share 
in those royalties, they made a decision which clearly evidences 
self-dealing and abrogates their fiduciary responsibilities to 
Rio, the other co-owner of the Audrey claims. 
For that matter, even where one co-tenant does not dele-
gate important operating rights to other co-tenants, tenants in 
common still owe each other fiduciary responsibilities in 
dealing with the property subject to their co-tenancy. ~~ 
Hendrickson v. California Talc Co., 55 Cal. App. 2d 279, 130 P.2d 
806 (1943) (also involving mining claims). As the Hendrickson 
court explained: 
The usual rules that a fiduciary relation-
ship exists between tenants in common 
and that one cotenant may not gain a 
present advantage by acting adversely to 
his fellow tenants should be applied to 
[this] case. 
-25-
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The general rule is that parties engaged 
in a common enterprise owe a duty to 
each other with respect to all matters 
in connection therewith, that a trust 
relationship is inherent in such an 
association for a common purpose, and 
that one of the parties will not be 
allowed to deal with the subject matter 
of the association for his own advan-
tage. 
-- 103 P.2d at 810. 
By the logic of the Hendrickson decision, then, the Audrey 
defendants have breached a fiduciary duty owed to Rio indepen-
dent of the responsibilities which they owed Rio by virtue of 
their exclusive right to exercise the royalty election. That 
is, the mere fact that Rio and the Audreys are both tenants in 
common of the subject claims is in itself independently suffi-
cient to create a fiduciary relationship between them, and when 
the Audreys permanently waived the election decision and engaged 
in self-dealing in agreeing to that waiver, they violated a 
basic fiduciary responsibility to Rio. 
For each of the foregoing independent reasons, the trial 
court erred in approving the Stipulation, as the conduct approved 
in the court's Order constituted a breach of fiduciary obliga-
tions to Rio. The Order must therefore be reversed. 
-26-
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPROVING 
THE STIPULATION BECAUSE THAT AGREEMENT 
BREACHES AN IMPLIED COVENANT BY THE AUDREYS 
IN FAVOR OF RIO. 
Not only does the Settlement Stipulation entail breaches of 
fiduciary duty owed by the Audreys to Rio, it also constitutes a 
breach of an implied covenant of good faith owed by the Audreys 
to Rio. Many jurisdictions recognize implied covenants in 
mineral leases which impose a duty on the operator of such 
leases to conduct the business to the mutual profit of both the 
lessee and the non-participating landowner-lessor. 
In Shaw v. Henry, 216 Kan. 96, 531 P.2d 128 (1975), for 
example, the Kansas Supreme Court recognized that all lessees 
under oil and gas leases are required by an implied covenant to 
exercise "reasonable diligence in doing what would be expected 
of an operator of ordinary prudence, in the furtherance of the 
interests of both lessor and lessee." 531 P.2d at 131. Accord: 
Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84, (5th Cir. 
1966); Harding v. Cameron, 220 F. Supp. 466, 470 (W.D.Okla. 1963). 
In this case, the Amended Audrey Lease contains an implied 
covenant that the Audreys will make the election determination 
in "furtherance of the interests of" all lessors, including Rio. 
The Audreys' waiver of their right to exercise the election in 
exchange for an additional yellowcake proceeds royalty in which 
Rio does not participate breaches that implied covenant. 
The implied covenant principles above stated with respect 
to oil and gas leases have been broadly applied to other situa-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tions involving tenants in common, and clearly derive from the 
beneficiary duties owed by co-tenants to each other. 
commentary has succinctly explained those principles: 
In certain situations, fiduciary duties 
between co-tenants will rest upon a bailiff 
arrangement. Where one co-owner surrenders 
management functions to another for the 
development of joint interests, the manager 
is called the bailiff and by the great weight 
of authority has a fiduciary status very 
similar to that of a trustee. Although he 
lacks title to a common trust corpus, he 
tacitly agrees to serve the property of all. 
lvhen he obtains an advantage over his co-
tenant by contract, he assumes the duty to 
exercise that advantage fairly and responsi-
bly. His fiduciary obligations, accordingly, 
are very broad. 
-- .Ciartz & Hames, "Implied Rights of Royalty 
Owners," 3 Rocky Mtn. Mineral Law Inst. 195, 
222 \1957). 
As one 
The same writers stress that implied duties have provided 
equitable protection to one party against overreaching by another. 
Equity will intervene where the following conditions are present: 
First, where the parties have a relationship 
to each other arising out of a common interest 
in the property or enterprise. Second, where 
they stand to gain or lose as a direct conse-
quence of failure of the enterprise. Third, 
where one party by contract or conveyance has 
obtained the executive control over the interest 
of another. And finally, where the non-
executive has no adequate way to protect him-
self against unfair or inequitable decisions 
of the executive. All of these elements 
characterize the mineral royalty relationship 
and give a sound basis for the implication of 
fiduciary duties to the mineral owner. 
-- Id. at 228-29. 
In summary, whenever one co-owner surrenders some "exe-
cutive control" to another, the executive co-owner occupies a 
-28-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fiduciary position. The Audreys' exclusive right to exercise 
the royalty election therefore imposes on them such responsi-
bilities to Rio. 
Furthermore, the Audreys owe Rio a duty to act in good 
faith simply by virtue of their status as co-owners. Examina-
tion of the Amended Audrey Lease (R. 74-125) reveals that Rio 
surrendered no rights in that document as an owner-lessor co-
tenant to its other tenants in common, except the right to 
participate in any decision as to whether or not to exercise 
the royalty election. Rio did not surrender any rights to 
participate fully in the proceeds arising out of its status as 
owner-lessor of an undivided one-fourth interest, or to demand 
and receive from its other co-tenants an accounting with 
respect to the use of, and proceeds derived from, the property. 
Tenants in common owe each other fiduciary duties with 
respect to their dealings with commonly held property. Conse-
quently, one or a number of co-tenants may not gain an advantage 
by acting adversely to his or their fellow co-tenants. See 
Webster v. Knop, 6 Utah 2d 273, 312 P.2d 557 (1957). If one or 
a number of co-tenants deal with commonly held property to the 
detriment of a fellow co-tenant, that fiduciary duty is breached. 
See Webster v. Knop, supra; Hendrickson v. California Talc Co., 
supra. 
In Webster v. Knop this Court considered facts analogous 
to the instant case and discussed the scope of a co-tenant's 
fiduciary duty. In that case, two plaintiffs and a defendant 
-29-
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executed a mining grubstake contract whereby plaintiffs supplied 
labor and the defendant furnished supplies. They agreed that 
each would receive a one-third undivided interest in any claim 
staked pursuant to the contract, which expired July 31, 1954. 
Various claims were filed in the names of the three parties. 
The parties were later informed that the claims were void 
because of an existing oil and gas lease. Congress then 
enacted legislation allowing valid claims to be filed over 
existing oil and gas leases. Thereafter, on August 14, 1954, 
the defendant refiled the claims in his own name. 
In holding that the scope of the fiduciary duty survived 
the expiration of the grubstake agreement, this Court emphasized 
equitable considerations. Defendant knew of the mining claims 
only out of his fiduciary relationship with plaintiffs. Defen-
dant's self-dealing attempt to use knowledge of the legislation 
and of the claims to gain title to an entire claim, when he had 
specifically agreed to a one-third interest, was deemed unfair. 
The foregoing discussion related to this case because the 
Webster court extended the fiduciary duty beyond the strict 
confines of the contract to prevent inequity. The contract had 
expired when the defendant refiled the claims. Nevertheless 
this Court held that the defendant's fiduciary duty required 
him to refile the claims in the name of all three parties. 
In this case, the Audrey defendants owe a fiduciary duty to 
their co-tenant, Rio. That duty is consistent with the lease and 
with the principles enumerated by this Court in Webster. By 
self-dealing with the Jimco defendants, the Audreys have 
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attempted to sever the link between themselves and Rio. 
Webster indicates that the Audreys' duty to their co-tenant to 
choose the more profitable royalty formula extends beyond the 
provisions of the lease and precludes them from self-dealing 
with the election. 
The foregoing authorities clearly support a finding that 
the Audreys are bound by an implied covenant of good faith which 
runs in favor of Rio in making the royalty election determina-
tion. This duty arises independently by virtue of (1) the 
parties' status as co-tenants and (2) the Audreys' responsi-
bilities to Rio as managers of the royalty election. Their 
overreaching in this case was approved by the trial court's 
Order implementing the Stipulation, and that Order must be 
reversed. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING 
RIO'S AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
Two weeks after the Audreys and the Jimcos submitted their 
Settlement Stipulation to the trial court for its approval, Rio 
submitted a motion to amend its complaint and a proposed amended 
complaint (R. 2023-24, 2099-110). Rio moved to amend its 
complaint on the grounds that the Stipulation gave rise to 
additional causes of action in its favor against both the Jimcos 
and the Audreys. 
Rio alleged in its Amended Complaint that the Audreys had 
breached fiduciary duties owed to it arising out of the election 
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option waiver and their common status as co-owners of the subject 
claims (R. 2104-07). Rio further alleged that the Jimcos had 
induced the Audreys to breach the fiduciary duties which the 
Audreys owed to Rio (R. 2107-09). Rio prayed for the imposition 
of a continuing constructive trust on the proceeds received by 
the Audreys arising out of the Stipulation and also sought 
damages from the Jimcos. 
The merits of Rio's claims for breach of fiduciary duty 
against the Audrey defendants are discussed at some length in the 
foregoing arguments and will not be reiterated here. Rio 
simply respectfully submits that the trial court erred in ruling 
that those claims failed to state a cause of action against the 
Audreys. 
As to Rio's claims that the Jimcos induced the Audreys to 
breach fiduciary duties they owed Rio, absolutely no evidence 
was taken by the trial court which would either support or 
negate that cause of action. Obviously, if the court below 
erred, as Rio asserts that it did, in dismissing the causes 
of action in Rio's Amended Complaint against the Audreys, it 
also erred in dismissing those causes asserted against the 
Jimcos, as it should have been entitled to conduct discovery and 
present facts to the trial court in support of its claims that 
the Jimcos induced the Audreys to breach those fiduciary duties. 
Rio submits that the trial court erred in refusing Rio the 
opportunity to conduct discovery and attempt to prove those 
claims, which involve material issues of fact as to the intent 
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of the parties and the detriment which would be suffered by Rio 
as a result of the Stipulation. Under those circumstances, 
either summary judgment or dismissal under Rule 12(b) (6) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is precluded. ~' Livingston 
Ind., Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 565 P.2d 1117, 1118 
(Utah 1977); See also, Bill Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abbott, 562 
P.2d 238, 239 (Utah 1977); Liquor Control Commission v. Athas, 
supra. Consequently, the trial court also erred in dismissing 
Rio's Amended Complaint and that portion of its Order must 
also be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
As the foregoing arguments and authorities demonstrate, 
the trial court erred both in approving the Stipulation and in 
dismissing Rio's Amended Complaint. For those reasons, the 
entire Order of the court below should be reversed. 
J 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~ day of January, 1979. 
YQRDON L. ROBERTS 
~&~~~~ N'f W~WINTEOLLE 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
79 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
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